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Formation of International Sales
Contracts under the 1980
Vienna Convention
A diplomatic conference met in Vienna in March-April 1980 to consider
a draft convention on the law governing international sales contracts. In its
Final Act of April 10, 1980 the conference adopted without dissent a Con-
yention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). As of
September 30, 1981 one state, Lesotho, had ratified the convention and
twenty other states, from all sectors of the world community, had indicated
their intention to do so by formally signing it.2 Although the CISG will
only enter into force twelve months after the tenth state ratifies the conven-
tion (CISG art. 99) this initial expression of support suggests that the CISG
will come into force in the near future. Whether or not the United States
*Member, State Bar of Texas. Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University;
Visiting Fellow, Trinity College, Oxford. Chair, A.B.A. Section of International Law,
Subcommittee on International Sales. I am indebted to John Honnold, Peter Pfund., Francis
Reynolds, and Paul Rogers for direct and indirect help. I am solely responsible, however, for
the following text.
'U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Final Act (April 10,
1980) (U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/18), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 668-99 (1980).
Subsequent citations to the convention will be given in the following form: CISG art. -. For
a brief summary of the proceedings at the Vienna conference see U.N. CHRONICLE 52 (June
1980).
'The convention was open for signature until 30 September 1981. CISG art. 91. The twenty
states that signed by this date include: Austria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,
Federal Republic of Germany, France, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, Italy,
the Netherlands, Norway, Peoples' Republic of China, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, the United
States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. In addition, Lesotho both signed and ratified the conven-
tion. Letter of December 1, 1981 from Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private
International Law, to the author. Although a state must follow signature with ratification
before it will be bound, it has been suggested that signature imposes a moral obligation to seek
ratification.
States that did not sign by September 30, 1981 are free to accede to the convention at any
time.
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ratifies the convention American traders and their advisers will have to
study its provisions.3
The CISG is divided into four parts: a general part defining the conven-
tion's sphere of application and providing rules of construction; a second
part on contract formation; a third part on the substantive rights and obli-
gations of parties to an international sales contract; and a final part setting
out rules on how states may formally adopt the convention and what reser-
vations they may make to it. Among the reservations permitted by this last
part is the right of a state to adopt either or both Parts II and III (CISG art.
92).
This essay focuses on the contract formation provisions in Part II, the text
of which is set out in an Appendix. After examining the background to
these CISG articles the essay illustrates the operation of Part II with
answers to a series of short hypothetical questions. The concluding section
evaluates these provisions in the light of domestic U.S. law and American
interests. The conclusion suggested is that the United States should ratify
the convention.
1. Background to the 1980 Convention
The final text of the 1980 convention represents fifty years of study. In
the 1930s legal experts from western Europe met under the auspices of the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) to
draft uniform rules for international sales contracts. Work on the forma-
tion of sales contracts began in 1934 but drafting was suspended during
World War II and this aspect of the original project was not taken up again
until 1956. The product of this study was submitted to a diplomatic confer-
ence convened at The Hague in 1964. The conference accepted the revised
draft of this early work as a uniform law annexed to one of two interna-
tional sales conventions adopted by the conference. The formation conven-
tion (ULF) requires a state ratifying it to incorporate the uniform law into
its domestic law.4
3The United States' government signed the convention on the advice of the U.S. delegation
to the Vienna conference and after close consultation with the Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law and the American Bar Association. At its annual
meeting in August, 1981 the A.B.A. House of Delegates recommended that the United States
sign and ratify the convention. At the time this essay is being written the Department of State
plans to forward the convention to the president to seek Senate advice and consent in early
1983.
Even if the United States does not ratify the convention it will still be of interest to U.S.
traders. In exceptional circumstances the CISG may apply to contracts to which a U.S. trader
is a party. See note 6 infra. Moreover, the text of the CISG is being used as a model for the
revision of national sales laws. Nordic countries, for example, are revising their law in the
light of the CISG.
4The text of the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods is set out in 834 U.N.T.S. 169 (1972), reprintedin 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 472 (1964), 3 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 864 (1964), 1 U.N. REGISTER OF TRADE LAW TEXTS 64 (1971). On the
background of ULF see Farnsworth, Formation of International Sales Contracts.- Three
Attempts at Unification, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 306-07 (1962).
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Although the ULF ultimately came into force it was soon apparent that
the 1964 conventions would not be widely adopted and that another
attempt had to be made to prepare a more acceptable text. Only seven
states (Belgium, Gambia, Italy, the Netherlands, San Marino, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany) have ratified or acceded to the ULF. Com-
mentators have been less critical of the substance of the ULF text than of its
attempt to extend its application to transactions that might have no contact
with a ratifying state and its failure to take into account the interests of non-
European countries, which were virtually unrepresented at the 1964 confer-
ence. To remedy these shortcomings the newly established U.N. Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) appointed a Working
Group in 1969 to review the 1964 conventions and to prepare new texts.
The Working Group devoted two sessions to revising the ULF and in 1978
it submitted a redrafted text to the Commission. After some modifications
the Commission adopted this text and integrated it with the substantive
rules on contract rights and obligations. The U.N. General Assembly then
convened a diplomatic conference in Vienna in 1980 to consider the UNCI-
TRAL text. The Vienna conference accepted this UNCITRAL draft with
only relatively minor modifications. 5
I. Formation of the International Sales Contract
Part II of the CISG (Art. 14-24) sets out the rules regulating the forma-
tion of an international sales contract. 6 The first four articles of Part II
'On the work of UNCITRAL and the background to the UNCITRAL draft see Honnold,
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J.
COMP. L. 201 (1979); Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods. An Overview, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 223 (1979). (These articles are part of a symposium
issue of the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW devoted to the work of UNCITRAL).
The proceedings of the 1978 meeting of the Commission are set out in UNCITRAL, YEARBOOK:
1978 at 31-45 (1979).
A brief summary and analysis of the final text is found in Note, International Trade- Uniform
Law of Sales, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 473 (1981). Professor John Honnold, who was co-chairman
of the U.S. delegation in Vienna as well as Chief of the U.N. International Trade Law Branch
and Secretary of UNCITRAL from 1969-1974, has prepared a detailed analysis of the CISG
to be published in May 1982 by the Dutch publishers, Kluwer.
For analysis of the formation provisions see Eorsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Forma-
tion of Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 311 (1979); Lansing &
Hauserman, .4 Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code to UNCITRAL's Convention on
Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 63 (1980). Both
articles must be read with care because the numbering of the articles was changed in the final
text.
'Unless the parties agree to exclude or derogate from its provisions the CISG will apply to
contracts between traders who have places of business in different states if these states are both
parties to the 1980 convention. CISG art. l(l)(a). The CISG is also applicable when conflict-
of-law rules ("rules of private international law") lead to the law of a state that is a party to the
convention. CISG art. l(l)(b). A ratifying state may declare that it will not be bound by this
latter provision. CISG art. 95. At the time it signed the convention the United States' govern-
ment announced its intention to make this declaration. For a study of the convention's scope
see R~czei, Area of Operation of the International Sales Conventions, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 513
(1981).
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govern the offer. These articles provide for the prerequisites of an offer
(Art. 14) and the withdrawal, revocation, and termination of an offer (Arts.
15-17). The following five articles set out the corresponding rules on
acceptance. They provide for the form an acceptance may take (Art. 18),
the effect of an acceptance that varies the terms of an offer (Art. 19), the
time allowed for acceptance (Arts. 20-21), and withdrawal of an acceptance
(Art. 22). Article 23 states that a contract is concluded when an acceptance
becomes effective, which normally will be when a notice of acceptance
reaches the offeror. A final provision, Article 24, defines when a communi-
cation "reaches" a party.
A reader trained in the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code
will find some surprises in both the style and the scope of these provisions.
In style the articles in Part II follow the civilian model of a comprehensive
collection of brief, general rules rather than the more detailed and convo-
luted statements found in common law legislation. 7 In scope Part II omits
several matters the common lawyer would expect to find among formation
rules. There is no statute of frauds; there is no reference to modification of
a contract; and there is no requirement that there be consideration in order
to have an enforceable contract. Several of these omissions are filled by
provisions found elsewhere in the CISG. An article in Part I provides that
an enforceable sales contract may be concluded without a writing (CISG
art. 11)8 and a provision in Part III states that a contract may be modified
by agreement of the parties in any form unless the original contract requires
the modification to be in writing (CISG art. 29). The CISG, however, con-
tains no provision for consideration. Of course this will rarely be a problem
in the context of sale where exchange of goods for money is the object of
the transaction. 9
Several important limitations on application of the convention should be noted. The parties
are free to exclude application of the convention or to vary the effect of any of its provisions.
CISG art. 6. Moreover, not all sales transactions or potential issues will be governed by the
CISG. The most important exclusions are of consumer sales (CISG art. 2(a)) and of claims for
death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person (CISG art. 5).
'For a comment on the civilian style of the formation provisions of ULF see Farnsworth,
supra note 4, at 310-13. Professor Farnsworth's criticism of ULF for excluding the role of
national law as a gap-filler (id at 311) is met by the CISG provision that gaps are to be filled,
by general principles of the convention and, in their absence, by the domestic law of the state
whose law would apply under the rules of private international law. CISG art. 7(2).
'The need to provide for payment, carriage, and customs formalities will normally generate
sufficient written evidence of a contract without worrying about the theoretical possibility that
a contract may be proved by any means. A trader, moreover, may insist in his offer or accept-
ance that he will not be bound until a written document is signed. Article 29 itself provides
that the concluded contract may require any modification to be in writing.
Article 96 of the CISG authorizes a ratifying state to declare that the convention's articles
which dispense with the formality of a writing will not apply when a party has his place of
business in that state. The U.S.S.R. and several east European states insisted on the inclusion
of Article 96 because their domestic law requires contracts to be properly documented for state
planning accountability. The United States does not plan to make a declaration pursuant to
Article 96.
'For comments on the CISG and consideration see E0rsi, supra note 5, at 316 (possible that
lack of consideration is question of contractual "validity" and therefore excluded from the
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Notwithstanding these differences in style and scope the CISG provisions
constitute a comprehensive codification which provides many of the same
answers found in the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code.' 0
This is illustrated by the answers set out below to questions arising in the
following hypothetical case. Seller, a manufacturer of equipment, has his
place of business in France. Buyer, an equipment dealer, has his place of
business in New York. In the following questions Buyer (the offeror) seeks
to enter into a contract with Seller (the offeree) for the purchase of equip-
ment. Assume that the CISG is in force and that both France and the
United States have ratified the 1980 convention.
Question I--On March 1 Buyer mails a letter to Seller enclosing a
purchase order form for specified equipment manufactured by Seller. The
letter makes specific reference to the price listed in Seller's catalog. Is
Buyer's communication an "offer?"
Buyer's communication would constitute an offer under both the CISG
and domestic U.S. law. The letter and form are addressed to a specific
person, are sufficiently definite, and presumably indicate Buyer's intention
to be bound if Seller accepts the order (CISG art. 14(1)). They are suffi-
ciently definite because they specify the goods, the quantity, and the price
(Id). The letter and form would also be an offer at common law. Buyer
has manifested his willingness to enter into a contract with Seller and the
terms are sufficiently certain because they provide a basis for determining
the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy (Rest. 2d
§§ 24, 29, 33; cf. U.C.C. § 2-204).
If Buyer had not made a specific reference to the price in Seller's catalog
he could have problems under the CISG in this type of situation where an
order is made with reference to a catalog. The CISG requires a proposal
expressly or implicitly to fix or make provision for determining the price
before it will be deemed an offer (CISG art. 14(1)). It is conceivable that
Buyer might not state the price or make a specific reference to the catalog in
the belief that this reference would be understood by Seller. If there have
been prior dealings between Buyer and Seller conducted in this way or if it
is a recognized custom in the trade that the price is deemed to be the price
convention by CISG art. 4(a)); Lansing & Hauserman, supra note 5, at 78-79 (not clear consid-
eration is an issue under the convention). See also Date-Bah, The United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980. Overview and Selective Commentary, I I
REv. Gu. L. 50, 59 (1979) (not often a problem in sales contracts, which "present clearest
paradigm of mutuality and exchange").
' "For the purposes of this essay the common law is assumed to be stated accurately in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). Subsequent citations to the Restatement and
the Uniform Commercial Code will be given in the following form: Rest. 2d § --; U.C.C. § -.
For a discussion of the Restatement provisions by the Reporter see Braucher, Offer andAccept-
ance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J. 302 (1964).
For comparative surveys of formation provisions see R. Schlesinger, Formation of Contracts,
A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems (1968); Cigoj, International Sales.- Formation of
Contracts, 23 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 257 (1976).
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set out in a catalog" I then Buyer's proposal "implicitly" fixes or makes pro-
vision for determining the price. If, however, there is no relevant course of
dealing and no usage of trade then Buyer's proposal will not be character-
ized as an offer because the language of the CISG suggests that the terms
listed (the goods, quantity, price) are necessary in order to satisfy the
requirements of definiteness. 12 As a result, if Seller delivers the equipment
to Buyer in response to Buyer's open-price proposal any subsequent dispute
between the parties will be governed by non-CISG legal rules (e.g., the
domestic law of quasicontract) because there has not been a completed con-
tract. 13 In this situation the CISG differs from the common law and the
Uniform Commercial Code, which are more receptive to the open-price
contract. 14
It is possible, but unlikely, that Seller's catalog will be considered an offer
under the CISG and the common law. Buyer's communication would then
be examined to see if it is an acceptance rather than an offer. Unless Seller
"clearly" indicates otherwise, however, a catalog circulated to the public at
large will be construed as only an invitation to members of the public to
make an offer (CISG art. 14(2); Rest. 2d § 29). On the other hand, catalogs
sent to specific dealers on a mailing list may be construed as making an
offer to each dealer. If the catalog is deemed to be an offer there would
usually be no difficulty about the price term because it would be listed in
the catalog. The catalog itself, of course, may include language which will
dispose of this problem. It might, for example, disclaim making an offer or
it might make the stated price in the catalog subject to subsequent unilat-
eral changes in price.
"CISG art. 9 states:
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices
which they have established between themselves.
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applica-
ble to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have
known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by,
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.
The Vienna conference adopted the U.S. proposal to add the phrase "or its formation" to
paragraph (2) to make clear that trade usages applied to Part II.
2But see Feltham, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, [1981] J. Bus. L. 346, 351 ("It is not clear whether this [second sentence in art. 14(1)] is
merely a statement of sufficient conditions of a sufficiently definite proposal or a statement of
necessary conditions.")
'
3One could argue that Seller's delivery is itself an offer (the implied price being that
charged by Seller at the time of delivery) which is accepted by Buyer taking delivery of the
goods. A court which does not find Buyer's proposal an offer, however, is unlikely to infer a
price when Seller makes no reference to a price at the time of delivery.
1'4The number of situations where the CISG will have an effect are relatively few. In addi-
tion to the situation illustrated by the hypothetical problem discussed in the text, the debates
within UNCITRAL and at the Vienna conference mentioned commodity transactions and
orders of spare parts. Trade usage or course of dealing, however, may supply the price term in
these situations. See note I I supra.
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Question 2--On March 2 Buyer sends a telegram countermanding the
letter of March 1. Assuming Buyer's earlier proposal was not an irrevoca-
ble offer, is Buyer's action effective?
Under the CISG, if Buyer's telegram reaches Seller before or at the same
time the letter of March 1 reaches him Buyer has "withdrawn" the offer and
Seller cannot accept it (CISG art. 15(2)). If the telegram reaches Seller after
the letter it will "revoke" the offer if Seller has not dispatched an accept-
ance or performed an act which is deemed an acceptance (CISG arts. 16(1)
and 18(3)). The telegram and letter will "reach" Seller when it is delivered
to him personally, or to his place of business or mailing address (CISG art.
24).
Although the common law uses the term "revocation" to cover both
"withdrawal" and "revocation" it answers question 2 in the same way.
Seller's unexercised power to accept terminates when Seller receives
Buyer's telegram (Rest. 2d §§ 36(l)(c), 42, 68). If Seller has already exer-
cised this power by sending a notice of acceptance or by otherwise
accepting the offer then the telegram will arrive too late and will not revoke
the offer. Seller will receive Buyer's telegram when he obtains possession of
it personally or by an agent, or when it is "deposited in some place which he
has authorized as the place for this or similar communications to be depos-
ited for him" (Rest. 2d § 68; cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(26), (27)).
Question 3-Buyer's March 1 letter states that his offer will lapse on
March 15 unless he receives Seller's notice of acceptance by that date. Is
Buyer's offer "irrevocable?"
This question raises a point much debated within UNCITRAL and at the
Vienna conference. 15 The relevant CISG provision states that an offer is
irrevocable "if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or
otherwise, that it is irrevocable." (CISG art. 16(2)(a)). The conference
adopted this text as a compromise between civil law and common law dele-
gations. The civil lawyers, familiar with legal systems that assume an offer
is irrevocable unless otherwise stated, made a concession by agreeing to
adopt in the CISG the general principle of revocability (CISG art. 16(1)).16
In turn, they urged the common lawyers to agree that where a businessman
states in his offer a particular period during which the offer is open this offer
should be irrevocable. The common lawyers replied that this proposal
failed to distinguish between a firm offer, which cannot be revoked, and an
offer which lapses at the end of the stated time but can be revoked at any
time. The language adopted in the CISG is described as a compromise
solution. 17
"E6rsi, supra note 5, at 321.
"This concession had already been made at the 1964 conference at The Hague. ULF art. 5.
See Lagergren, The Uniform Law on Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, [1966] J. Bus. L. 22, 27-29.
7 Although the point was debated at the 1980 conference, the text which was ultimately
incorporated in the CISG was adopted at the 1978 UNCITRAL meeting. The arguments of
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Perhaps the best way to read the CISG text in the light of this drafting
history is to stress the importance of the offeror's intent and how a reason-
able offeree would understand the offer. To answer question 3, therefore,
requires close scrutiny of the language of Buyer's communication and the
context in which it is made. The question suggests that Buyer's letter uses
the word lapse, which suggests that Buyer understands the common law
distinction and therefore did not intend to make an irrevocable offer.
When interpreting Buyer's statement, however, we must consider not only
what Buyer intended but also what Seller knew or should have known
about Buyer's intent (CISG art. 8).18 Course of dealing and usage of trade
will, therefore, be relevant (CISG art. 9).19 If the offeree-Seller reasonably
the different view points are summarized as follows in the summary of the UNCITRAL
deliberations:
135. In support of this proposal [the compromise text ultimately adopted], it was stated
that the principal test to determine that an offer could not be revoked was whether
the offer indicated that it was irrevocable. Whether the offer was irrevocable could
be determined by the fact that it stated a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise.
However, the mere fact of stating a time for acceptance would not automatically lead
to the result that the offer was irrevocable if, under the circumstances of the case,
such a result was not intended. In particular, it was said, where a merchant from one
common law country made an offer to a merchant from another common law coun-
try, the fixing of a time for acceptance without more would not indicate that the offer
was irrevocable.
136. However, there was considerable support for the view that the interpretation placed
on the words of the text by its proposers was unjustified. It was considered that this
text clearly adopted the rule that, if the offer stated a fixed time for acceptance, it
automatically was irrevocable.
UNCITRAL, YEARBOOK: 1978 at 41 (1979). The report of the proceedings concludes laconi-
cally: "The Commission decided to accept the wording of the compromise proposal ....
Id at para. 137.
"CISG art. 8 states:
(I) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a party
are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not have
been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other conduct of
a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the
same kind as the other party would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding of a reasonable person
would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case
including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between them-
selves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.
"CISG art. 9. See note 11 supra. One common law commentator has concluded:
At the Plenipotentiary Conference, some of the common law delegations suggested that in a
transaction between traders from common law countries in which the offeror fixed a time for
lapse of the offer and was so understood by the offeree not to have made an irrevocable
offer, this would be a situation where the stating in an offer of a fixed time for its acceptance
could not be interpreted by a reasonable court to mean that the offer was irrevocable. This
result could easily be reached by a common law court; but it is to be doubted whether a civil
law court would come to this conclusion.
Date-Bah, supra note 9, at 58. See also Feltham, supra note 12, at 352 (statement of a fixed
time "would presumably not be so treated [as irrevocable] when a trader in one common law
country stated a fixed time for acceptance to a trader in another common law country."). But
see Ebrsi, supra note 5, at 321 (CISG provision should be interpreted to promote uniform
application; see CISG art. 7(1)).
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believed the offer was irrevocable and acted in reliance on this belief (art.
16(2)(b) the offer will be deemed irrevocable (CISG art. 16(2)(b)). Presum-
ably this might be the case in question 3 because the offeree is a Seller
whose principal place of business is in a civil law jurisdiction.
Although there is a greater likelihood that an offer will be found irrevo-
cable under the CISG than would be the case at common law (Rest. 2d
§§ 24, 42) the policy of the CISG is consistent with the policy of the firm
offer provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-205 of the
Code provides:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms
gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of considera-
tion, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no
event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term
of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the
offeror.
In some respects the Code provision is more restrictive than the CISG text.
The offer must be made by a merchant, in a signed writing, for a period no
longer than three months. Nevertheless, under the facts outlined in ques-
tion 3, it would appear that the CISG and the Code would yield the same
result.
On one point tangential to question 3 the CISG and the common law
may diverge. If the offer set out in the question is deemed irrevocable may
it be withdrawn? The CISG explicitly authorizes withdrawal of even an
irrevocable offer if the withdrawal reaches Seller before or at the same time
as the offer (CISG art. 15(2)). The common law, on the other hand, has
virtually no case law authority on this point presumably because there is a
presumption of revocability. 20 What little case law there is deals with the
special case of letters of credit, rather than sale of goods contracts, and deci-
sions holding that an irrevocable letter of credit cannot be withdrawn may
not be extended to sales contracts.
Question 4-On March 8 Seller mails a letter rejecting Buyer's order.
Later the same day Seller changes his mind. May Seller still accept Buyer's
offer?
Under the CISG Seller may change his mind but he must act promptly so
that his acceptance reaches Buyer before the letter of rejection. Buyer's
offer does not terminate until Seller's letter reaches him (CISG art. 17).
Seller's written acceptance will become effective when it reaches Buyer and
a contract will be concluded at this time (CISG arts. 18(2) and 23).21 If the
acceptance arrives before the letter of rejection, therefore, a contract will be
formed and the rejection letter will be of no effect. A prudent Seller will, of
"2 R. Schlesinger, supra note 10, at 714-16.
2 Although the CISG does not address the issue of simultaneous receipt of a rejection and an
acceptance presumably the acceptance received in these circumstances should be effective by
analogy to other CISG provisions. See CISG art. 15(2)("an offer... may be withdrawn if the
withdrawal reaches the offeree before or at the same time as the offer"). See also CISG art. 22.
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course, use telex or the telephone followed by a written confirmation noting
that the rejection is to be considered a nullity.
A more difficult problem will occur if Seller is authorized to accept
Buyer's offer by beginning performance, as he may be by the terms of
Buyer's offer, course of dealing or usage of trade (CISG art. 18(3)). In this
situation Seller accepts the offer the moment he performs an act, such as
dispatching the equipment, which indicates his intention to take up the
offer. If this performance occurs before the letter of rejection reaches Buyer
the rejection will be irrelevant because it will arrive after the contract is
concluded. No prudent offeree, however, will rely solely on this conceptual
argument. Although the relevant CISG provision does not require the
offeree-Seller to give Buyer notice that he has performed the act (CISG art.
18(3)), a judge or arbitrator may construe this provision in the light of the
general good faith requirement so as to require notice under the circum-
stances outlined in question 4.22
The common law agrees with the general proposition that Seller's accept-
ance will be effective if it overtakes the letter of rejection (Rest. 2d §§ 38, 40,
68),23 but the common law also provides that a rejection does not terminate
an irrevocable offer (Rest. 2d §§ 25, 37). An acceptance that arrives after
the letter of rejection will, therefore, be effective if the offer is irrevocable.
On this latter point the common law differs from the CISG because the
latter provides explicitly that even an irrevocable offer is terminated when
notice of rejection reaches an offeror (CISG art. 17).
Question 5-On March 8 Seller mails a letter accepting Buyer's order.
Later the same day Seller changes his mind. May Seller still reject the
offer?
The CISG explicitly permits Seller to withdraw an acceptance if the with-
drawal reaches Buyer before or at the same time as the acceptance would
have become effective (CISG art. 22). Where notices have been sent an
acceptance will be effective when it reaches the offeror (CISG art. 18(2)).
As in question 4, however, there will be problems if Seller has accepted by
beginning performance. Conceptually the answer is clear: there is no way
that a withdrawal can reach Buyer before the acceptance becomes effective
and Seller's rejection will be a repudiation of a contract. On the other
hand, if Seller has changed his mind and has not given notice that he has
started performance a judge or arbitrator may be predisposed to find
Seller's acts sufficiently ambiguous to allow a finding that Seller's acts do
not indicate acceptance, especially where Buyer has not relied on the
performance.
2 CISG art. 7(I)("ln the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had .. to the
need to promote . . the observance of good faith in international trade"). Note that good
faith is relevant to interpretation of the convention; there is no general obligation that the
parties carry out their obligations in good faith. Cf U.C.C. § 1-203.23See also RESTATEMENT 2d § 40, Comment, b. Query regarding an acceptance which
arrives simultaneously with the rejection. For similar uncertainty under the CISG see note 21
supra.
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Under the common law the result will differ depending on whether or not
the offer was revocable. If the offer was revocable Seller's acceptance was
effective when mailed and Seller cannot withdraw it (Rest. 2d §§ 63(a), 66).
If, on the other hand, the offer is irrevocable the acceptance is not effective
until it reaches the offeror and Seller, therefore, can withdraw it by a notice
which overtakes the earlier letter (Rest. 2d § 63(b)).
Question 6-On March 8 Seller begins to assemble the equipment for
shipping but does not notify Buyer that he has accepted Buyer's offer. On
March 15 Buyer sends a telegram countermanding his order of March 1.
Assuming Buyer's original offer was revocable, is Buyer's action effective?
Under the CISG Buyer's notice of revocation will be effective if it reaches
Seller before Seller has "dispatched" an acceptance or before Seller has
performed an authorized act indicating acceptance (CISG arts. 16(1) and
18(3)). There is no question of the dispatch of an acceptance because under
the facts set out in question 6 Seller has sent no notice at all to Buyer.
Where Seller is authorized to accept by performing an act, however, the
CISG makes acceptance effective on performance of the act without the
need to notify the offeror. If the acceptance is effective there is a completed
contract and Buyer's attempt to revoke the offer will be too late. The
answer to question 6, therefore, turns on whether Seller's act of assembling
the equipment for shipment is sufficient to indicate acceptance. As dis-
cussed in the answer to question 4, Seller may be authorized to accept by
performing an act by virtue of Buyer's offer, course of dealing, or usage of
trade. Question 6 does not give sufficient information for us to draw any
conclusions on this point. Even if we assume acceptance by performance is
authorized it is still not clear that the assembling of equipment will be a
sufficiently clear indication of assent. The CISG refers to "the dispatch of
the goods" as an example of an appropriate act but surely a less dispositive
act may also indicate assent. An appropriate test in the context of question
6 might be whether an outside observer would be able to tell from Seller's
act of assembling the equipment that the equipment is to be used to fill
Buyer's order.
These same issues will arise under the common law and the Uniform
Commercial Code. Both the common law and the Code permit an offeree
to accept an offer in any manner reasonable in the circumstances, including
the rendering of performance (Rest. 2d §§ 30, 32; U.C.C. § 2-206). Both
laws differ from the CISG, however, in that they require Seller to ensure
that Buyer learns of the performance. If Seller does not notify Buyer at
common law Buyer's contractual duty is discharged, while under the Code,
Buyer may treat his offer as having lapsed before acceptance (Rest. 2d § 56;
U.C.C. § 2-206(2)). Under either law Buyer will be bound for a reasonable
time and cannot revoke during this period. This is supplemented by the
common law rule that mere preparation to perform is not an acceptance but
may make the offer irrevocable as an option contract (Rest. 2d §§ 87; 52,
Comment b).
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Question 7-On March 8 Seller sends a printed form accepting Buyer's
order but adding a term that purports to require Buyer to arbitrate any
dispute arising out of the contract. Buyer receives this form and says noth-
ing. Do Seller and Buyer have a contract and, if they do, does the contract
include the arbitration term?
The general rule in the CISG is that if Seller's purported acceptance
makes any addition or modification to Buyer's original offer the acceptance
will operate as a rejection and counter-offer (CISG art. 19(1)). As an excep-
tion to this general principle the CISG incorporates into the contract imma-
terial alterations set out in the acceptance but the number of cases that will
fall within this exception is limited by a very narrow definition of material-
ity (CISG art. 19(2), (3)). Seller's arbitration term, for example, would
materially alter Buyer's offer because it relates to "the settlement of dis-
putes." Under the facts set out in question 7, where neither Seller nor Buyer
has performed, there is no contract because Buyer's original offer has been
rejected, Seller's "acceptance" is a counter-offer, and Buyer's silence will
not operate as an acceptance of the counter-offer (CISG art. 18(1)). If
Buyer subsequently accepts Seller's delivery of the equipment arguably his
act will operate as an acceptance of the Seller's counter-offer and the arbi-
tration term will be part of the agreement.
The common law and the Uniform Commercial Code have retreated
from the "mirror-image" rule. If a purported acceptance includes addi-
tional or different terms and makes the acceptance conditional on the
offeror agreeing to these terms then the acceptance is a counter-offer (Rest.
2d § 59). Nothing in question 7, however, suggests that acceptance is condi-
tional. Where the acceptance is not conditional the acceptance is effective
and the additional or different terms are to be construed as proposals for
modification of the contract (Rest. 2d § 59, Comment a). In question 7,
therefore, the arbitration term would be an additional term and would only
be part of the contract if Buyer accepted it. Buyer's silence is unlikely to
operate as an acceptance of the arbitration term (Rest. 2d § 69). The Code
differs from the common law by providing that an additional term in the
acceptance becomes part of the contract between merchants unless it mate-
rially alters the offer (U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b)). Whether or not a term provid-
ing for arbitration would be a material addition is a much-debated question
in the United States but most court opinions have found it to be material.24
The Code would probably answer question 7, therefore, in the same way as
the common law.
Question 8-Buyer's March 1 letter states that his offer will lapse "in
fifteen days." Buyer mails the letter on March 2; it reaches Seller in due
course on March 5. Seller sends an acceptance by telegram on March 16.
Do Seller and Buyer have a contract?
'See, e.g., Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239, 24
UCC REP. 257 (1980).
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We cannot give a definitive answer to this question under either the
CISG or the common law. On one point the CISG is clear where the com-
mon law equivocates: under the CISG the fifteen-day period begins to run
from March 1, the date shown on the letter (CISG art. 20(1)).25 Both laws,
however, provide that to be effective the acceptance must reach the offeror
before the end of the period stipulated in the offer (CISG art. 18(2)). The
difficulty in determining when the period ends lies in the contract language
("in fifteen days"). Should we count the day of dispatch? Should we read
"in" to mean "before" (not counting the last day) or "not more than"
(counting the last day)? If the contract clause is interpreted to mean the
offer ends on March 16, Seller's acceptance telegram must reach Buyer on
March 16, i.e. the day it is sent, unless March 16 is an official holiday or a
nonbusiness day at Buyer's place of business, in which case it will be effec-
tive if it arrives the next business day (CISG art. 20(2)).
If Seller's acceptance is found to have arrived late it may still be given
some effect. The CISG distinguishes between an acceptance which would
have arrived late in any case and an acceptance which the accepting party
could have expected to arrive on time but for some reason beyond his con-
trol it arrives late. In the former case, Buyer may choose to treat the late
acceptance as an effective acceptance but if he does so he must notify Seller
of his decision "without delay" (CISG art. 21(1)). In the latter case, where
under normal conditions the notice of acceptance shows it would have
arrived on time, the acceptance is effective unless Buyer decides not to treat
it as an acceptance and so notifies Seller without delay (CISG art. 21(2)).
The common law does not make this distinction. If Seller's acceptance
arrives after the Buyer's offer has lapsed it will be treated as a counter-offer
which must be accepted by Buyer before there is a contract (Rest. 2d § 70).
Buyer's silence will normally not operate as an acceptance (Rest. 2d § 69).
Since Seller's acceptance may be effective as an acceptance despite varia-
tions in the terms of the offer (U.C.C. § 2-207(1), (2)) it is no doubt appro-
priate to give Buyer, as the original offeror, greater protection than under
the CISG.
Although not directly relevant to the answer to question 8, which
assumes that Buyer's offer arrived in due course, the way the CISG and the
common law deal with the delayed offer provides an interesting contrast
with the delayed acceptance. The CISG does not deal specifically with the
problem of delay in transmission of offers, although there are such provi-
sions for acceptances (CISG art. 21(2)) and for notices sent in accordance
with provisions in Part III (CISG art. 27). These latter provisions protect
the party transmitting the delayed notice by giving at least some effect to
the notice. By analogy we might protect the offeror by not giving effect to
the offer if it arrives later than the date the offeror would expect the offer by
its terms to lapse. An exception might be made if the offeree reasonably
"Cf 2 R. Schlesinger, supra note 10, at 1499-1500. See REST. 2d § 41(l).
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relies on the assumption that the offer is effective (cf. CISG art. 16(2)(b)).
In effect, this is the solution adopted by the common law (Rest. 2d § 49).
III. Conclusion: The CISG and American Interests
A quick review of the preceding discussion will show the extent to which
the CISG represents a compromise between civil law and common law con-
cepts. The CISG rejects, for example, the civil law presumption that offers
are irrevocable in favor of the common law presumption of revocability,
but the CISG also includes a "firm offer" exception similar to that found in
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. § 2-205). Although an acceptance
will not be effective until it reaches the offeror (thus rejecting the common
law "mailbox rule") the CISG does provide for the most important effect of
the common law rule: an offeror may not revoke an offer once an accept-
ance is dispatched (CISG arts. 16(1), 18(2)).
The result of this conceptual amalgam is that not all cases will be
resolved in the same way under the CISG and U.S. law. 26 The probable
effect of the convention will be to enforce somewhat fewer "agreements"
than would be enforced under domestic law. The CISG, for example,
emphasizes the need for definiteness in an offer which means that an "open
price" offer will not be effective (CISG art. 14; cf. U.C.C. § 2-305). Where
exchanged forms do not match, application of the CISG will lead to fewer
enforceable contracts because it requires the terms of an acceptance to con-
form to those of the offer except in narrowly defined cases where alterations
are not material (CISG art. 19; cf. U.C.C. § 2-207).
Notwithstanding these differences the formation provisions of the CISG
are compatible with American interests. As the answers to the questions set
out above illustrate, the CISG and U.S. law resolve many problems in the
same way and the relatively few differences will not be significant in prac-
tice. Although the CISG does not recognize an "open price" offer, for
example, course of dealing and usage of trade will frequently supply the
necessary detail. Moreover, to the extent that the CISG enforces fewer
"agreements" this may be desirable where parties deal with each other at a
distance and across national boundaries because it will force parties to pro-
duce more evidence of a concluded agreement. Finally, it should be noted
that the CISG formation provisions are an improvement on the existing
state of affairs. Conflict-of-law problems are particularly difficult with
respect to formation issues: the parties cannot choose applicable law
because the very existence of the parties' agreement is the question being
asked. 27 At present a U.S. trader involved in a dispute about contract for-
'In some respects the traditional common law rules on formation are closer in spirit to the
CISG than the Uniform Commercial Code. Common law rules, such as the mirror-image rule
for offer and acceptance, reflect a greater emphasis on conceptualism which results in fewer
enforceable contracts.
27See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 200 (1971). See also 2 E. RABEL,
THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 520-28 (2d ed. U. Drobnig 1960).
International Sales Contracts 15
mation faces the costs of researching and proving foreign law in domestic or
foreign courts. The CISG, which is available in an official English text and
which no doubt will be heavily annotated, provides a single acceptable text
that over time should significantly reduce these costs.
Studies of the CISG as a whole have also concluded that the 1980 con-
vention is compatible with American interests. The U.S. delegation to the
Vienna conference, the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private
International Law, and the American Bar Association have all endorsed the
CISG and have recommended that the United States' government ratify the
convention. The report prepared by the Section of International Law for
the A.B.A. House of Delegates states:
The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods was pre-
pared over many years with considerable care, drawing on the technical advice of
experts from all parts of the world. The United States participated extensively
and effectively in the drafting process. Although on a number of points differing
national law solutions are replaced with compromise provisions, many of the
CISG provisions are similar in approach and content to the Uniform Commercial
Code. The major objections to the 1964 Hague conventions made by the United
States have been resolved by the 1980 CISG text. The Convention will promote
U.S. business interests and the United States will gain political goodwill by
prompt signature and ratification of the Convention. 8
Academic analysts have come to similar conclusions.29 This essay, which is
more modest in scope than these other studies, suggests merely that there is
no reason for the United States not to adopt Part II when the United States
ratifies the 1980 Vienna convention.
28A.B.A. Section of International Law, Report to the House of Delegates 13-14 (April 1981).
"See Lansing & Hauserman, supra note 5, at 80 ("In the final analysis, the Convention is
not likely to present complex legal adjustments for American attorneys schooled in the Uni-
form Commercial Code. Indeed, many attorneys will be pleasantly surprised by the relative
ease with which transition between legal schools of thought can be accomplished."); Comment,
A New Uniform Lawfor the International Sale of Goods: Is It Compatible with American Inter-
ests? 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 129, 177-78 ("It provides solutions to many of the concerns that
merchants and lawyers feel pervade the international sale of goods. A unique opportunity to
unify an area of law which continues to present obstacles to international commerce is at hand.
In light of the substantial advantages provided by this Convention, United States ratification




Formation of the Contract
Article 14
(1) A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific per-
sons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of the
offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A proposal is sufficiently definite if it
indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for deter-
mining the quantity and the price.
(2) A proposal other than one addressed to one or more specific persons is to be
considered merely as an invitation to make offers, unless the contrary is clearly indi-
cated by the person making the proposal.
Article 15
(1) An offer becomes effective when it reaches the offeree.
(2) An offer, even if it is irrevocable, may be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches
the offeree before or at the same time as the offer.
Article 16
(1) Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation
reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance.
(2) However, an offer cannot be revoked;
(a) if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that
it is irrevocable; or
(b) if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and
the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.
Article 17
An offer, even if it is irrevocable, is terminated when a rejection reaches the
offeror.
Article 18
(1) A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an
offer is an acceptance. Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance.
(2) An acceptance of an offer be.comes effective at the moment the indication of
assent reaches the offeror. An acceptance is not effective if the indication of assent
does not reach the offeror within the time he has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within a
reasonable time, due account being taken of the circumstances of the transaction,
* including the rapidity of the means of communication employed by the offeror. An
oral offer must be accepted immediately unless the circumstances indicate
otherwise.
(3) However, if, by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices which the parties
have established between themselves or of usage, the offeree may indicate assent by
performing an act, such as one relating to the dispatch of the goods or payment of
.the price, without notice to the offeror, the acceptance is effective at the moment the
act is performed, provided that the act is performed within the period of time laid
down in the preceding paragraph.
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Article 19
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions,
limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a
counter-offer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains
additional or different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer
constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to
the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does not so object, the
terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications contained in
the acceptance.
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, pay-
ment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one
party's liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to alter the
terms of the offer materially.
Article 20
(1) A period of time for acceptance fixed by the offeror in a telegram or a letter
begins to run from the moment the telegram is handed in for dispatch or from the
date shown on the letter or, if no such date is shown, from the date shown on the
envelope. A period of time for acceptance fixed by the offeror by telephone, telex or
other means of instantaneous communication, begins to run from the moment that
the offer reaches the offeree.
(2) Official holidays or nonbusiness days occurring during the period for accept-
ance are included in calculating the period. However, if a notice of acceptance
cannot be delivered at the address. of the offeror on the last day of the period
because that day falls on an official holiday or a nonbusiness day at the place of
business of the offeror, the period is extended until the first business day which
follows.
Article 21
(1) A late acceptance is nevertheless effective as an acceptance if without delay
the offeror orally so informs the offeree or dispatches a notice to that effect.
(2) If a letter or other writing containing a late acceptance shows that it has been
sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it would have
reached the offeror in due time, the late acceptance is effective as an acceptance
unless, without delay, the offeror orally informs the offeree that he considers his
offer as having lapsed or dispatches a notice to that effect.
Article 22
An acceptance may be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches the offeror before or
at the same time as the acceptance would have become effective.
Article 23
A contract is concluded at the moment when an acceptance of an offer becomes
effective in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
Article 24
For the purposes of this Part of the Convention, an offer, declaration of accept-
ance or any other indication of intention "reaches" the addressee when it is made
orally to him or delivered by any other means to him personally, to his place of
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business or mailing address or, if he does not have a place of business or mailing
address, to his habitual residence.
